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rings increases the precision of competing estimates. We demonstrate that, in average value
auctions, this leads to more aggressive bidding. On the other hand, since collusion decreases
the number of active bidders, competition is lessened, reducing the price paid at auction. We
demonstrate that the reduction in competition dominates the informational e®ects, resulting
in lower prices. We examine these hypothesized e®ects experimentally by conducting a series
of auctions with constant informational content but a varying number of bidders among whom
this information is distributed. The experimental results are consistent with our theoretical
predictions for di®erent value and auction mechanism speci¯cations.
JEL Classi¯cation Numbers: D44, L41, C92
Key Words: common value auctions, mergers, collusion, information
Please address correspondence to:
Mikhael Shor, 352 Management Hall, 401 21st Avenue South, Nashville, TN 37203
or by email, mike.shor@owen.vanderbilt.edu, or phone, (615) 343-4334
¤The authors would like to thank Octavian Carare, Eric Friedman, Luke Froeb, Ron Harstad, Toshi Iizuka, Mike
Rothkopf, and Charles Thomas for useful comments on a previous draft of this paper.1 Introduction
Antitrust policy is driven by an almost universally accepted maxim among economists: in the
absence of o®setting e±ciency gains, collusion and mergers decrease competition, leading to higher
market prices. This traditional industrial organization viewpoint is directly applicable to private-
value auction markets { mergers among parties are privately pro¯table (Mailath and Zemsky 1991)
and reduce the number of active bidders, leading to diminished revenue for the seller (Waehrer and
Perry 2003, Froeb, Tschantz, and Crooke 1999).
However, pure common value auctions, in which buyers would agree on the object's value ex-
post, present a challenge to this traditional viewpoint. The post-merger decrease in competition is
inexorably linked to an increase in the precision of value-estimates as merged (or colluding) parties
share their information. On one hand, we will still have a reduction in competition which tends to
lower the auction price. On the other hand, several e®ects can lead to more aggressive bidding as a
result of collusion or mergers. First, by diminishing the number of active bidders, mergers mitigate
the e®ects of the winner's curse (Pinkse and Tan 2000, Bulow and Klemperer 2002, Hendricks,
Pinkse, and Porter 2003). Since the winner of an auction likely has the most optimistic estimate,
outbidding fewer competitors implies less chance that one's estimate is overly optimistic, decreasing
the likelihood of overbidding. Second, a merged or colluding entity is likely more informed about
the value of the underlying asset than individual bidders. This \information pooling" alleviates the
winner's curse and could also lead to more aggressive bidding (DeBrock and Smith 1983, Hendricks
and Porter 1992).
While mergers in traditional markets can be analyzed by holding sources of potential e±ciency
gains constant and later determining what e±ciency gains can o®set the loss of competition, these
e®ects are harder to isolate in common value auction settings. While the above studies, among
others, have contributed to our understanding of joint bidding, none resolve de¯nitively the impact
on revenue when the greater aggressiveness of bidding is tempered by the fewer bids tendered to
the auctioneer. The goal of this paper is to disentangle these two e®ects and suggest what role
joint bidding plays on the hammer price in particular types of common value auctions. Further, we
take a view of joint bidding as the sharing of individual bidders' estimates within a group, whether
by collusion or by mergers. Most studies envision information as a notion of precision { e.g., a
group of two bidders receives a single estimate of the object's value which is more precise than that
obtainable by either bidder individually. Yet, if two bidders merge, each with an independent signal
of an object's value, the new entity now has two signals.
In our model, a merger entails decreasing the number of bidders while simultaneously providing
each bidder with additional signals, or estimates of the object's value. Hence, we envision a merger
not as changing the structure of information in an industry, but the concentration of that information
among bidders. We espouse a broad view of \mergers," including the acquisition of one ¯rm by
another and the formation of temporary, single-purpose bidding consortia, (Hendricks, Pinkse, and
Porter 2003, for example). We develop a theory of symmetric mergers in average value auctions, in
which the object's value is equal to the mean of all of the signals. To the existing literature on this
model (Krishna and Morgan 1997, Mares 2001, Bulow and Klemperer 2002), we add a comprehensive
description of post-merger equilibrium bidding in both ¯rst-price and second-price mechanisms and
a general result on the price impact of mergers. We demonstrate that since merged bidders are
better informed, they do bid more aggressively. However, since mergers also entail a reduction in
the number of bidders, the impact of reduced competition outweighs the e®ects of better information,
resulting in lower prices.
1Laboratory experiments were run to verify these theoretical predictions and evaluate the sen-
sitivity of prices to information concentration. The growing body of literature on common value
auctions in experimental settings shows that people often fail to bid in accordance with equilibrium
predictions and often fall prey to the winner's curse.1 We wish to test the qualitative implications of
our theoretical results, i.e., that greater industry concentration, holding information constant, leads
to more aggressive bidding and declines in expected price. The experimental data show marginally
more aggressive bidding post-merger and a decline in revenues. For robustness, we also examined
experimentally an a±liated signals model in which signals are independent draws from a distribution
centered on the object's true (unknown) value.2 In these auctions, bidding is again more aggressive
as information is concentrated, and the decline in revenues as a result of the merger is more dramatic.
In the next section, we present our theoretical results for mergers in average value auctions. Sec-
tion three describes the experimental methodology and design considerations. Section four contains
experimental results and general observations. Section ¯ve concludes.
2 Mergers and Collusion in Auctions
Our model of common value auctions is a special case of the general symmetric model developed
by Milgrom and Weber (1982). This modeling choice o®ers the bene¯t of relatively clear and well-
understood baseline comparisons. The modeling challenge in this line of research on information
pooling and joint bidding arises from the multidimensional nature of the signals obtained by bidders.
We can conceive of better information in two ways: either the better-informed party receives a
more precise estimate of the object's value than other bidders, or simply receives more estimates. In
the ¯rst case, more informed bidders may draw their signals from a distribution more concentrated
about the true value.3 In the second, collusion or joint bidding is represented by a greater concen-
tration of signals among fewer bidders.4 While the multiple signals approach is a more intuitive
notion for mergers { the amount of information does not change following a merger, but simply
the allocation of it { the framework presents a challenge for analysis. In fact, Milgrom and Weber
implicitly avoid the complications of bidding with multidimensional signals in their treatment of the
general symmetric model:
To represent a bidder's information by a single real-valued signal is to make two substan-
tive assumptions. Not only must his signal be a su±cient statistic for all the information
he possesses concerning the value of the object to him, it must also adequately summa-
rize his information concerning the signals received by other bidders. The derivation of
such a statistic from several separate pieces is in general a di±cult task. (Milgrom and
Weber 1982, p.1097 fn.14).
Most inroads in this ¯eld concentrate on cases where the information conveyed by a vector
of signals can be summarized by a scalar statistic. This has a clear advantage as it reduces the
1See Kagel and Levin (2002) for a recent review.
2This formulation of a common a±liated value has received much experimental attention, and is analyzed in Dyer,
Kagel, and Levin (1989) and Kagel and Levin (1986), and in the context of private value auctions by Kagel, Harstad,
and Levin (1987) and Harstad (2000), among others.
3This is the approach in Schweizer and von Ungern-Sternberg (1983) and in the information acquisition models of
Matthews (1984) and Persico (2000).
4See, for example, Mares (2001), Krishna and Morgan (1997), and DeBrock and Smith (1983).
2problem to one within the general Milgrom and Weber (1982) framework. Krishna and Morgan
(1997) and Mares (2001) analyze second-price average value auctions by recognizing the average of a
bidding ring's signals as a scalar summary statistic for the group's information. Within the context
of an average value auction, this is both an intuitive notion and a su±cient statistic. However,
in most auctions, the reduction of a multidimensional signal to a scalar statistic is less obvious.
Mares (2001) derives a general expression for the reduction of multidimensional signals into a scalar
summary statistic, but notes that such a scalarization does not exist in general.5 Furthermore,
examples by Jackson (1999) and Mares (2001) suggest that in general the problem of bidding with
multidimensional signals might not admit an equilibrium.
In the rest of this section and in the subsequent experiments, we examine two models of pure
common value auctions. First, the average value model has been used extensively in the literature
and has the advantage that it allows for closed-form solutions of the bidding function for most merger
scenarios.6 To derive the equilibrium bid functions for this model, we rely crucially on the possibility
of aggregating the informational vector of each bidding ring (group) into a scalar { a single number
which is a su±cient statistic for the informational content of the group's signals. Second, in order to
check the robustness of our results, we also conduct experiments in an a±liated signals model that
does not admit scalar su±cient statistics for a multidimensional vector of signals. In this auction,
signals are drawn from some distribution centered on the object's true but unknown value.
2.1 The average value model
Consider ¯rst an average value auction, in which the object's value, V , is equal to the mean of all





Furthermore assume that the private signals are i.i.d. with a common distribution function F and





the random variable that is the average of k independent signals distributed as Xi. Denote the
distribution function of Xk with Gk and its density with gk. We will limit ourselves in this section
to situations where the support of the distribution is bounded, and for computational simplicity, we
assume that the support of Xi is [0;1]; although most results can be extended easily to non-compact




k:n denote the density, distribution and expected value of the k-th lowest order
statistic out of a sample of n i.i.d. random variables distributed as X.7 If there is no danger of
confusion we drop the superscript in this notation. We also employ the notation ¯FP;Y
n ;¯SP;Y
n to
5Other scalar summary statistics have been adopted for speci¯c models. DeBrock and Smith (1983) use the
geometric mean of signals when the signals and value are distributed lognormal. Goeree and O®erman (2003) propose
using the expected surplus in a model with additively separable private and common value components.
6See Krishna and Morgan (1997) and Mares (2001) for a full description. Additive speci¯cations are common in
the literature (Albers and Harstad 1991, Bikhchandani and Riley 1991, Bulow and Klemperer 2002, Campbell and
Levin 2002).
7Thus, we adopt the convention that the 1st order statistic is the smallest and the nth (in a sample of n) is the
largest.
3denote the symmetric equilibrium bids in ¯rst-price and second-price average value auctions with n
bidders where signals are distributed i.i.d. as Y .
In this paper, we consider only symmetric mergers, i.e., mergers where each of the bidding rings
sees the same number of signals. This makes the determination of the equilibrium bids relatively
straightforward since the merged problem is another instance of the general symmetric model where
the private information of a bidder is Xk rather than X. Thus a merger is described as m agents
receiving k signals, where n = km. In other words the total amount of information in the economy,
across merger pro¯les is constant.
A number of studies have identi¯ed certain e®ects of mergers on bidding in second price auctions
described by this model in which a collection of bidders share their information truthfully and submit
a joint bid. First, the aggregation of independent signals allows a bidding consortium to pool its
information, deriving more precise estimates of the object's value and potentially implying a smaller
winner's curse correction (DeBrock and Smith 1983). Second, an \inference e®ect" captures the
notion that one bidder's better information may lead others to bid more aggressively (Krishna and
Morgan 1997). Particularly i n a second-price auction, a less-informed bidder is not as fearful of
overbidding since a better-informed bidder would e®ectively set the price. In e®ect, outbidding
a well-informed party carries less risk in a second-price mechanism than in a ¯rst-price auction.
Third in asymmetric settings, a \con¯dence e®ect" drives more informed bidders to form optimistic
estimates of other bidders' information (Mares 2001). Fourth, decreasing the number of bidders,
even without an o®setting increase in information for each bidder, may lead to more aggressive
bidding. To avoid the winner's curse, subjects bid more cautiously in auctions with more bidders.8
All of these identi¯ed e®ects tend to work in the same direction { mergers reduce the number of
bidders and correspondingly increase the concentration of information, all leading to higher bids, on
average.
In ¯rst-price auctions the e®ects of a merger on bidding behavior may be decoupled into two
e®ects. The ¯rst isolates the role of the number of bidders without an o®setting increase in infor-
mational precision. The second considers the role of more precise information without a change
in the number of bidders. In the following lemmas, we determine the role of each of these e®ects
independently, and then show the overall e®ect of mergers on bidding behavior.
Competition E®ect In a second-price average value auction, the reduction in the number of
active bidders has a positive e®ect on the aggressiveness of bidding. The symmetric ¯rst-price and
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E[XjX · x]: (2)
8In ¯rst-price auctions, this e®ect is ambiguous. Actually, a winner's curse e®ect dictates a reduction in bids as
the number of bidders increases, but the competition e®ect suggests that one needs to bid higher when competing
against more bidders to maintain a chance of winning. Pinkse and Tan (2000) and Bulow and Klemperer (2002)
demonstrate that bids may decline with more bidders. Hendricks, Pinkse, and Porter (2003) demonstrate this e®ect
in OCS wildcat auctions. The opposite e®ect has also been obtained both experimentally (Kagel and Levin 1986) and
in econometric analysis of ¯eld data (Hong and Shum 2002).
4from which we deduce that
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(x ¡ E[XjX · x]) ¸ 0:
That is, decreasing the number of bidders increases the bid in a second-price auction. Intuitively, the
more people I outbid, the more likely that I have overestimated the object's value and fallen prey to
the winner's curse. Thus, more bidders implies a greater adjustment for the winner's curse. Analysis
of bidding in a ¯rst-price auction is less straightforward since bidders shade from the expected value
not only to account for the winner's curse but also to balance the price paid with the odds of winning.
While we still expect that reducing the number of bidders should encourage a smaller winner's curse
adjustment, less bidders also implies more bid shading since any bid is more likely to win with
less opponents. Since these e®ects work in opposite directions, the e®ect of reducing the number
of competitors is ambiguous. However, the next result shows that for large enough n we ¯nd the
same result as in the second-price auction { namely that the reduction in the number of participants
produces more aggressive bidding.
Lemma 1 (Competition e®ect) For every x 2 [0;1],
(i) ¯FP;X
n (x) is unimodal in n, and
(ii) ¯SP;X
n (x) is decreasing in n.
The proof of this and all other results are relegated to the appendix. Note that varying n in
the ¯rstprice auction does not generate the same clean comparative results as in a second-price
auction. The di®erence follows from the fact that a decrease in the number of bidders reduces both
competition and the winner's curse but increases the relative importance of one own's signal. In this
model in particular, fewer bidders are associated with more informational content of one's private
signals. Since, in this construction, the value is a deterministic function of private information, a
decrease in the number of players is also an increase in the informational content of each private
signal.
Information Pooling In this section, we consider the e®ect of increasing the precision of bidders'
signals while holding the number of bidders constant. We borrow from information acquisition mod-
els the intuition that a \more accurate" signal is one drawn from a distribution more concentrated
about the true value (Persico 2000, Athey and Levin 1998). It is well established that X2 is more
precise than X in the sense of a lower variance.9 We adopt a stronger notion of concentration than
the one implied above. Following Whitt (1985), consider two random variables X and Y with equal
supports and identical ¯rst moments. Y is more precise than X in the sense of the log-concave
order, denoted by Y ¹lc X; if
fY
fX is log-concave. The advantage of this ordering of information is
that it o®ers a natural condition for the comparison of truncated means since it can be established
that Y ¹lc X implies that
E[XjX · x] · E[Y jY · x]: (3)
for arbitrary x (see appendix for a formal proof). Note that the log-concave order implies the usual
convex order between random variables. For our purposes, the salient feature is that if X has a
log-concave density then X2 is more precise than X in the log-concave order. We use this order to
evaluate the e®ect of more precise information on equilibrium bidding in ¯rst-price auctions.
9See, for example, Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994).
5Lemma 2 (Information pooling) If Y is more precise than X in the sense of the log-concave
order then
(i) there exist a tX;Y;n and t0
X;Y;n such that 0 < tX;Y;n · t0
X;Y;n < 1 and ¯FP;Y
n (x) ¸ ¯FP;X
n (x)
for x in [0;tX;Y;n] and ¯FP;Y
n (x) · ¯FP;X
n (x) for x in [t0
X;Y;n;1], and
(ii) ¯SP;Y
n (x) ¸ ¯SP;X
n (x) for all x.
Increasing the precision of the signal has an ambiguous role in ¯rst-price auctions. It tends
to decrease the variability of the equilibrium bid without moving the entire bid function in one
direction. For low values of the signal, the increase in precision generates more aggressive bidding
through the e®ect of (3). For high values of the signal, this e®ect diminishes since E[X] = E[Y ],
that is, the unconditional expectations are equal. Consider a bidder with a signal equal to 1, the
upper support. If signals are more concentrated, having a competitor with a signal close to 1 is less
likely than if the distribution were more dispersed. Hence, a bidder with a signal of 1 can pro¯tably
shade his bid more when he faces opponents with more concentrated information, leading to lower
bidding.
On the other hand, it is also easy to establish that in second-price auctions the e®ect of more
precise information is clear cut. In the equilibrium bidding function (2), the term E[XjX · x]
increases if X is replaced by a more precise distribution (in the sense of the log-concave order).
Thus, we will see higher bids when the precision of information increases.
Equilibrium Bidding In considering a merger, both the competition and information pooling
e®ects are present since we are reducing the number of bidders while simultaneously increasing the
informational precision. In second-price auctions, both e®ects work to make bids more aggressive,
while ¯rst-price auctions present some subtleties. The following result characterizes the overall
impact of symmetric mergers on bidding in ¯rst-price average value auctions. Consider an average
value model with n = k £ m signals where we allow mergers into m groups of k bidders each. The




m the respective symmetric equilibrium bid functions before and after a
merger for ¯rst-price auctions. Analogously, denote by ¯
SP;X
km and ¯SP;Xk
m as the corresponding bid
functions in the second-price auction.
Theorem 1 If the distribution of signals, F, is log-concave then
(i) there exists a sk;n;F > 0 such that ¯
FP;X
km · ¯FP;Xk
m for x in [0;sk;n;F]: For ¯xed k and high
enough n there exists a s0
k;n;F ¸ sk;n;F such that ¯
FP;X
km · ¯FP;Xk





m for all x.
In essence, the theorem states that post-merger equilibrium bidding in ¯rst-price auctions is more
aggressive for low values of the signal. For high signals, the comparison depends on n. When the
number of bidders is small, it is possible that merged bidding is less aggressive than \solo" bidding.
As we increase the amount of information in the economy, however, this comparison will reverse. In
particular, the lemma implies that, for any k, ¯
FP;X
km (1) < ¯FP;Xk
m (1) for high enough n. For high
values of the signal, a large amount of information in the economy (large n) implies that the precision
of information e®ect (information pooling) outweighs the reduction in the number of bidders. Note
















2 bidders (m=2, k=3)
3 bidders (m=3, k=6)
6 bidders (m=6, k=2)
Figure 1: Equilibrium bidding functions when X » U[20;60] and N = 6, for k 2 f1;2;3g. Greater
concentration leads to more aggressive bidding for low signals, and less aggressive bidding for signals
close to the upper bound of the support.
are distributed uniform, exhibits this property (See Figure 1). Mergers in second-price auctions
unambiguously increase the aggressiveness of bidding.
Equilibrium Prices Having established that post-merger bidding is by and large more aggressive,
we turn to the analysis of prices. From the standpoint of the auctioneer, these potentially higher bids
come at the expense of the number of bidders. By construction, our model exhibits independence of
signals and symmetry both before and after a merger, which implies revenue equivalence of standard
auction formats.10 In a second-price average value auction, Krishna and Morgan (1997) and Mares
(2001) prove that log-concavity of the signals is su±cient to guarantee increased aggressiveness of
bidding in symmetric mergers. Krishna and Morgan also conjecture that revenue may increase with
concentration since the increased aggressiveness might outweigh the reduction in the number of
bidders.
Aggregating all the forces that a®ect equilibrium bidding, we ¯nd that the overall reduction in
the number of bidders outweighs in equilibrium all gains that can be expected from more aggressive
bidding. The result below holds for both ¯rst-price and second-price auctions since, by construction,
we have focused only on situations where revenue equivalence between auction types prevails.
Theorem 2 Symmetric mergers reduce expected revenues in average value auctions.
2.2 An A±liated Signals Model
While in the average value auction, the mean of a group's signals is a natural su±cient statistic, the
existence of symmetric bidding equilibria in auctions with multidimensional types is not a foregone
conclusion (Jackson 1999). We present a simple conditionally-independent a±liated signals model
which exempli¯es the impossibility of information aggregation.
10Independence and symmetry amongst bidder types is a su±cient condition for revenue equivalence. See, for
example, Waehrer, Harstad, and Rothkopf (1998).
7Consider an auction in which each participant receives a signal drawn independently from a
uniform distribution on [V ¡ a;V + a], centered at the object's (unknown) value, V , which is itself
drawn from some known distribution. In e®ect, nature draws a value and then provides noisy signals
from a distribution centered on that value.
It can be established that, in this situation,
fV j(x1;:::;xk) (vj(x1;:::;xk)) » ©(maxfx1;:::;xkg;minfx1;:::;xkg)ª(v);
or that the minimum and the maximum constitute a minimal su±cient statistic for V .11
Since intermediary signals do not contribute to an estimate of the object's value, at most two
signals carry informational content. It also follows that no uni-dimensional su±cient statistic exists.
In the above example, if two of a bidder's signals are a and 3a, the value of the object is known with
certainty to be 2a and no adjustment for the winner's curse is warranted.12
2.3 Summary
Our modeling choice is motivated by two factors. First, both auction formats are rather intuitive
for experimental subjects. The average value auction can be motivated by the familiar wallet game
(Klemperer 1998) in which each person bids for an amount of money equal to the average of the
participants' wallets' contents, based solely on knowledge of his own net worth. The a±liated signals
auction represents a standard story of bidding for drilling rights by bidders who have collectively
conducted exploratory drilling over the ¯eld. Exploration, by its very nature, provides a noisy signal
of the value of oil contained in the site.
A second motivation for selecting these two cases is the signi¯cant di®erence between the two
mechanisms in the way multiple signals enter into one's expectation of the object's value. In the
average value auction, multidimensional signals can be easily aggregated into a scalar su±cient
statistic. In our a±liated signals model, such a reduction is not possible. At the interim stage, these
two models also have contrasting implications. In the average value auction, a bidder draws the
same inference from any two signals, regardless of their respective realizations, as long as their sum
is constant. In the a±liated signals case we study, a bidder facing more dispersed signals can make
tighter predictions about the true value or at least its support. As mentioned above, in the extreme
case in which two signals are 2a apart, a bidder knows the value for sure. This also implies that at
the interim stage a bidder with two signals can be better informed than a bidder with three signals
with positive probability. It is only at the ex ante stage that more signals provide better information
in both models. Finally, in the average value auction, the value is a deterministic function of the
information sample { i.e., the grand coalition knows the value of the asset with certainty. The
a±liated signals model exhibits persistent residual uncertainty { no matter how large a ¯nite sample
of draws we consider, we will ¯nd, with probability 1, that the information contained in the sample
will not allow us to predict the value with certainty.13 Thus, we envision these two auctions to
be quite di®erent, qualitatively. This gives an additional degree of robustness to any experimental
¯ndings that are constant across the two treatments.
11See, for example, Migliorati (1998).
12Kagel and Levin (1986) provide a characterization of the equilibrium bid in a ¯rst-price auction for this model
assuming uniform priors.
13This is true for a continuous uniform distribution. As we utilize a discrete distribution in the experiments, there
is always a small chance of receiving two signals that are fully informative.
8Table 1: Experimental Treatments
Treatment Auction Type Auction Format m k
I a 6 1
I b Average Value 1st Price 3 2
I c 2 3
II a 6 1
II b Average Value 2nd Price 3 2
II c 2 3
III a 6 1
III b A±liated Signals 1st Price 3 2
III c 2 3
IV a 6 1
IV b A±liated Signals 2nd Price 3 2
IV c 2 3
3 Experimental Design
In this section, we describe an experiment intended to test our theoretical conclusions. Since we can
expect subjects to deviate from equilibrium bidding behavior, the experiments serve as a robustness
check allowing us to verify if the comparative statics results still obtain.
Experimental subjects participated in a series of three auctions. In each auction, a total of
six \signals" were distributed among the bidders. However, the number of bidders varied across
periods. In the ¯rst period, each of six bidders received a signal, and placed a bid. In the second
period, subjects competed against two other bidders (three total), with each participant receiving
two signals. Lastly, period three saw two bidders competing with three signals each.
Each subject was randomly assigned to one of four treatments, combining an auction type (aver-
age value or a±liated signals) with and auction format (¯rst-price or second-price sealed bid). These
treatments are summarized in Table 1. Subjects submitted bids independently over the Internet and
were not informed of the outcome of any auction until after the conclusion of the experiment, at
which point earnings were tabulated.14
A total of 204 subjects participated, 60 in each of the ¯rst-price treatments (I and III), and 42 in
each of the second-price treatments (II and IV). For each auction type, a total of ten ¯rst-price and
seven second-price auctions were run with groups of six bidders, each receiving one signal. Twenty
(fourteen) and thirty (twenty-one) ¯rst-price (second-price) auctions were held with three and two
bidders, respectively, for both the average value and a±liated signals auctions.
Subjects were MBA students and all had some classroom exposure to common value auctions,
some in multiple courses. Further, in informal interviews after the experiment, most subjects in-
dicated some experience with participating in auctions, ranging from low value online purchases to
formulating bidding \strategies" for mid-size businesses in procurement auctions. Notably, none
admitted to any experience with collusion in auctions.
In the average value auction, six signals were drawn from a discrete uniform distribution over
14Subjects received a $5 participation fee and participated in other experiments not reported here in which losses
were not possible, to make up for the potential losses from the winner's curse.
9the integers f20;21;:::;60g. The value of the object was known to be equal to the average of
these signals. The a±liated signals auction followed a two-step procedure. A value was selected
from a known uniform distribution over the integers f0;1;:::;200g. Then, each signal was drawn
independently from the uniform distribution fV ¡ 20;:::;V + 20g. All numbers represent actual
dollar amounts.
The experimental design abstracts from the real issue of collusion and mergers in three important
ways. First, each bidder receives multiple signals representing the additional information obtained
by a ring of bidders who pool their information. However, this assumes that the consortium's
representative has access to all of the members' signals and ignores the very real issue of truthful
revelation of signals in collusive settings. Collusion involves consideration of revenue-sharing issues
and incentive-compatible mechanisms for truthful signal revelation.15 Hence, this experiment is
more akin to a takeover scenario since the acquiring ¯rm has an incentive to aggregate all available
information.
Second, a single decision-maker obtains all of the signals, and captures all of the potential revenue
from the auction. In some sense, collusion should involve interaction among participants, perhaps
in the sense of joining subjects into groups, rather than signals. However, this would impose a
less-tractable social-psychology dimension to the experiment, and it is unlikely that the dynamics
that would be observed in the laboratory represent inter- and intra-¯rm relationships.
Lastly, the partition of signals is exogenous, enforced by the experimenter. Issues of incentives to
merge and collude are therefore avoided. In this sense, this experiment answers the \what if" e®ect
of mergers, rather than the \why." Alternately, it may be seen as mergers among multi-product
¯rms for whom these auctions represent minor portions of revenue, and hence the e®ects of merging
in this auction market are negligible relative to other concerns.
4 Experimental Results
All four treatments demonstrate both an upward trend in bids and a downward trend in price as
the number of bidders is decreased (Figure 2). Speci¯cally, the bidding functions increase with
concentration (Figure 3), yet this is not enough to o®set the loss of competition. However, the
results of these experimental sessions are mostly anecdotal. A di®erent random pairing of subjects
would potentially produce di®erent results. For example, two of the four highest bids in the ¯rst-
price average value auction were matched into the same group of six bidders. If these bidders were
to ¯nd themselves in di®erent sessions, both would likely win, signi¯cantly increasing the average
winning price. In the a±liated signals auction, two of the three \most conservative" bidders, bidding
the minimum possible value given their signals, were randomly grouped, leading to unusually high
surplus for the winner.
Our interest, however, is not in the speci¯c results of these sessions, but in the e®ect of collusion
and mergers on expected bids and revenue. E®ectively, auction participants map signals into bids,
and the auctioneer selects the highest or second highest such signal as the winning price. In the
remainder of this section, we formulate an analogous approach. First, we compute the empirical
distribution of bids in each auction and in each treatment. This distribution will allow us to consider
whether bidding is more aggressive with fewer bidders. Then, we use that distribution to arrive at
an empirical distribution of resulting prices based on the observed bidding strategies.
15Mailath and Zemsky (1991) characterize a mechanism for collusive rings in a private-value auction to both elicit
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Figure 2: Bids and prices in experimental average value and a±liated signals auctions. Decreasing
the number of bidders while simultaneously increasing the number of signals per bidder leads to













First Price Average Value
2 bidders (m=2, k=3)
3 bidders (m=3, k=6)













Second Price Average Value
Figure 3: Empirical bidding functions in average value auctions. In both ¯rst-price and second-price
average value auctions, bidding becomes more aggressive with increased concentration, holding the
total number of signals constant.
As a preliminary note, it is important to verify that, for each auction type, the distribution of
signals is similar across the three treatments. In e®ect, we wish to con¯rm that enough sessions
were run to justify this simulation approach and rule out treatment e®ects resulting from distinct
empirical distributions of signals. The empirical distribution of signals (Figure 4) should closely
approximate the uniform distribution, from which signals were drawn. In comparison with the
uniform distribution, each of the twelve empirical distributions yields a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S)
test statistic of between 0.596 and 1.166 (p-values between 0.132 and 0.869). In the twelve pair-wise
tests between empirical distributions of signals (three within each of four treatments), the K-S test
for equivalence of distributions resulted in p-values between 0.492 and 0.999. In all cases, we cannot
reject that signals are distributed uniform and similarly across the treatments.
If similar signals are received in each treatment, on average, then systematic di®erences in bids
across treatments may be attributed to the e®ects of mergers and information concentration. We
can consider the bids of subjects independent of their signals to determine, on average, what bidding
patterns emerge. In all four auction formats, bidding is more concentrated about the mean bid as
information is dispersed among fewer bidders (Figure 5). This is hardly surprising since a more
precise estimate of the object is obtained. More interesting results are obtained with respect to
bidder aggressiveness.
Result 1 Bidding becomes more aggressive in the average value auction as information is concen-
trated from six bidders to two. The e®ect of intermediary concentration is ambiguous.
The empirical distribution of bids in the average value auction suggests that bids issued by


































































































































































Figure 4: Cumulative distribution of signals for the average value auctions and a±liated signals
auction. For the a±liated signals auctions, signals are adjusted (s ¡ V ). The distribution of signals































First Price Average Value
6 bidders (m=6, k=2)
3 bidders (m=3, k=6)





























































































Second Price Affiliated Signals
Figure 5: Empirical cumulative distributions of bids for the average value and a±liated signals
auctions. For the a±liated signals auction, bids are adjusted (b ¡ V ).
14holders of only one signal in the six bidder case. Further, the distribution of bids in the six-bidder
treatments are signi¯cantly di®erent from the distribution in the two bidder case (K-S p=0.013 for
¯rst-price and p=0.028 for second-price). However, the e®ect on bidding of incremental concentration
{ from six bidders to three, and from three to two { is unclear (K-S p ranges from 0.345 to .564). A
symmetric merger to two ¯rms leads each party to bid more aggressively in a stochastic-dominance
sense { for most bids (those below the expected value of the object conditioned on the signal), the
probability that the merged group bids higher than some given amount is larger than the probability
that an unmerged party will bid as aggressively.
Likely, the number of sessions does not allow for greater statistical precision in comparison of the
intermediary case. Graphically, the three-bidder case appears to represent more aggressive bidding
than the six-bidder treatments. However, these treatments cannot provide enough data to test this
proposition. Yet, in the a±liated signals auction, we can con¯rm a continuous trend with greater
concentration.
Result 2 Bidding becomes more aggressive with increased concentration of information in the af-
¯liated signals auction. Further, bidding behavior incorporates the (ex-post) accuracy of a bidder's
signals.
Visual inspection of the empirical distribution of bids in the a±liated signals auction only serves
to reinforce the ¯nding that bids become more concentrated about the mean as a result of mergers.
Little can be concluded about the aggressiveness of bids by examining the empirical distributions.
However, in the ¯rst-price auction, all three distributions seem to suggest an equal probability
of placing a bid above (below) the object's actual value. Those bidding above (to the right of the
intersection near 0) are generally falling prey to the winner's curse. The bids of the remaining bidders
demonstrate signi¯cant treatment e®ects { there is much greater discounting, on average, in the case
of a single signal for each bidder than the discounting after a merger. Nevertheless, in comparisons
of the three empirical distributions, the distribution of bids with six bidders is signi¯cantly di®erent
from that with three bidders (K-S p=0.012), and the move from six to two bidders is more dramatic
than in the average value auction (K-S p<0.001).
This a±liated signals auction di®ers from the common value auction in two important respects.
First, not each signal is equally valuable, since an additional signal contributes to my estimate of
the object's value only if it lies outside the convex hull of my current information. Second, my
expected value for the object is independent of the number of bidders or signals. In the average
value auction, the total number of signals distributed among bidders determines what proportion of
information a given bidder has. Increasing the total number of signals leads to less weight placed
on one's own signals, as they are less informative. In the a±liated signals auction, the estimation
of the object's value depends only on one's lowest and highest signals. The more signals I have, for
example, the better chance that two will highlight the range of the uniform distribution from which
they are drawn. Hence, the concentration of information within a merged party is more important
than the distribution of information among bidders. This allows us to better isolate the e®ects of
information.
We posit a simple bidding heuristic in which a bidder shades an amount, ®, from the expected
value of the object given the bidder's signals, (incorrectly) accounting for the winner's curse e®ect.
Further, the bidder raises the bid in response to better information. A simple measure of the
precision of information in this context is:
measure of certainty = max[s1;:::;sk] ¡ min[s1;:::;sk]
15Table 2: Regression results for bidding behavior. p-values for the t-test statistic are in parentheses.
Auction




(< 0:001) (< 0:001)
F statistic 24:52 17:55
(< 0:001) (< 0:001)
Consider the following regression equation:
bid = E [V js1;:::;sk] ¡ ® + ¯(measure of certainty)
The results of this regression are presented in Table 2.
Two inferences may be drawn from this exercise. First, ¯, the parameter representing the
precision of information, is highly signi¯cant and does not vary signi¯cantly across treatments.
Second, the regression results are highly signi¯cant, suggesting that the simple model is a reasonable
approximation of bidding behavior. Perhaps more interesting is that participants appear to bid
without consideration for the number of competitors.16 In short, subjects appear to follow a bidding
heuristic based only on their signals, since neither the number nor the allocation of signals enters
into E[V js1;:::;sk] or into the regression. Yet, despite the use of simple bidding heuristics, more
aggressive bidding and lower prices still obtain.17
The e®ect of mergers on bidding appears in line with Theorem 1. A greater concentration of
signals among fewer bidders increases the aggressiveness of bids. However, this e®ect is tempered
by the loss of competition.
Result 3 The expected auction price decreases with greater concentration for both auction types.
This inference could be drawn from the observed winning bids (Figure 2). However, a more
general question is whether bidding behavior observed in this experiment implies higher bids on
average rather than as the result of one pattern of random pairing of subjects. To answer this
question, the empirical bid distributions (Figure 5) were used to calculate the probability of a given
auction price. For example, for the six-bidder (one signal each) ¯rst-price average value auction, the
16Additional regressions included combinations of the number of active bidders and the number of signals per bidder.
None of these treatments induced any qualitative change in the regression results. None of the newly introduced
variables were signi¯cant at the 10% level.
17A methodological question remains: can bidding behavior be explained if we restrict subjects to a single, scalar
variable as a descriptive statistic of the whole of a bidder's information. A number of regression equations were
estimated, incorporating the number of bidders (m), the number of signals per bidder(k), along with various transfor-
mations of the signals into scalar values. Speci¯cally, individual regressions were run using the maximum, minimum,
and median signal, as well as various linear and nonlinear transformations (mean, geometric mean, etc.). Further,
both equilibrium and heuristic bidding behaviors were modeled. None of the eighteen functional forms tried produced
signi¯cant ¯ts at the 1% level, compared to the highly-signi¯cant ¯t of the simple model. This supports our intuition
that subjects' behavior cannot be explained by a scalar summary statistic. Further, the addition of parameters m





























































































First Price Affiliated Signals
2 bidders (m=2, k=3)
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Second Price Affiliated Signals
Figure 6: Empirical cumulative distributions of winning bids for the average value and a±liated
signals auctions. For the a±liated signals auctions, bids are adjusted (b ¡ V ).
probability of a given price is equivalent to the probability that one bidder \draws" this value from
the appropriate bid distribution and the remaining bidders draw smaller values.
This exercise likens an auction to a lottery drawing. The seller draws six balls from an urn
containing numbered balls (with replacement). The seller's lottery winnings are equal to the highest
number drawn (or second highest in a second-price auction). The e®ect of a merger, in the most
optimistic case, is that each ball is relabeled with a higher number. Hence, the new distribution of
balls stochastically dominates the former, and a given draw from the new urn will produce a higher
number on average. However, if the in°ation of winnings comes at the expense of the number of
draws, then the lottery participant is drawing higher numbers on average, but less of them. Thus,
the e®ect on the auction price is ambiguous, and depends on the increase in an average draw relative
to the decrease in the number of draws. The derived distributions of prices are presented in Figure
6.
In both auction models considered, the distribution of prices in more information-concentrated
auctions dominate those of less-concentrated treatments. For almost any target price, the post-
merger bidders are less likely to meet the target than the pre-merged ¯rms. This e®ect is not subtle.
The K-S test statistic in all twelve pair-wise comparisons of distributions (three per treatment) yields
p-values of less than 0.001.
175 Conclusion
In this paper we address two simple questions related to mergers in common value auctions. We ¯rst
ask whether mergers increase the aggressiveness of bidding, re°ecting the e®ects of more concentrated
information on the winner's curse correction. Second, we ask what impact such aggressiveness
has on the ¯nal auction price. We ¯nd that bids do increase as a result of mergers and do so
in correlation with concentration, although the latter can be con¯rmed statistically only for the
a±liated signals case. However, this more aggressive bidding does not o®set the downward price
pressures of diminished competition.
A ¯rst extension is to consider asymmetric mergers. Such analysis could have a prescriptive
purpose, aiding our understanding of the incentives to merge and of merger \waves," as ¯rms not
yet part of a bidding ring may perceive their inferior information as a competitive disadvantage. A
second extension may focus on multi-unit auctions in which the informational e®ects must also be
balanced against demand reduction.
Traditional policy analysis exploits the robust relationship between market concentration and in-
dustry performance. In the case of private-value auctions, traditional industrial organization models
prove fruitful if capacities and market shares are replaced by budget constraints and distributions of
valuations. The growth of auctions as allocation tools has called into question the causal relation-
ship between market structure and e±ciency, driven by a number of interdependent e®ects which
make the consequences of mergers and collusion unclear. While we highlight experimental results
in line with the traditional thinking about the e®ects of mergers on prices, much more exploration
is required.
It is di±cult to provide comparisons across auction types. Ideally, a uni¯ed theory would provide
the conditions under which post-merger bidding is more aggressive, and under which the ¯nal auction
price is expected to be higher. However, we know that such results rely critically on the speci¯cation
of the value function, distribution of bids, and the partition of information among bidders. Even
subtle changes in any of these assumptions may put the analytical computation of the equilibrium
bids out of reach. Yet, in two common value auctions with very di®erent properties, we observe
similar responses to mergers both in aggressiveness of bidding and ¯nal price. While the magnitude of
these adjustments varies, the commonality of the patterns implies (limited) hope that generalizations
are possible.
18Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 1
To establish the proof of the ¯rst lemma, we require two technical results.


















Proof. Following Milgrom and Weber (1982), de¯ne
v(x;y) = E[V jX1 = x;Y 1 = y]
where Y 1 is the highest amongst all signals other than X1: In ¯rst-price auctions with independent







while in second-price auctions
¯SP;X
































where n is the number of active bidders and X;X1;:::;Xn¡1 are independent draws from the same














































(E[max(X1;:::;Xn¡1)jmax(X1;:::;Xn¡1) < x] ¡ E[XjX · x]):









Note that in the case where n = 2, this expression is simply ¯2(x) = E[XjX · x].
For the second-price auction in our model we have, without loss of generality,
¯SP;X













Claim 2 If F and G are positive continuous functions such that [F(x)=G(x)] is decreasing (increas-










0 F(s)ds R x
0 G(s)ds is decreasing (increasing) in x.
Proof. We will provide a proof only for the decreasing case. The statement for increasing can












This property implies that
R x
0 F(s)ds R x




































Finally, we can provide a proof of the ¯rst lemma.
Proof of Lemma 1. We proceed in two steps. First, we establish that if X1;:::;Xm are i.i.d.
variates, then
E[max(X1;:::;Xk)jmax(X1;:::;Xk) · x] · E[max(X1;:::;Xm)jmax(X1;:::;Xm) · x]
for all x if k · m. Note that max(X1;:::;Xk) » Fk and max(X1;:::;Xm) » Fm and by the above




0 F m(s)ds is decreasing. Taking the derivative of the logarithm of the last
















which establishes the ¯rst step. In the second step, we show that ¯FP;X
n (x) ¡ ¯
FP;X
n¡1 (x) crosses 0
only once. Note that
¯FP;X
































De¯ne the random variable
Z = XjX · x
Then the above may be rewritten as
¯FP;X





























Note that both ¹Z
n:n and ¹Z
n¡1:n are increasing sequences that tend to x. Furthermore, it is
well established that ¹Z
n:n ¡ ¹Z











crosses 0 only once for each Z (and implicitly for each
x) giving us the desired result.
Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 2
In the next lemma, we use the log-concave order (¹lc) introduced by Whitt (1985). Considering the
i.i.d. random variables Y1;:::;Yn and the i.i.d. random variables X1;:::;Xn, Yi ¹lc Xi indicates
that the Y 's are more concentrated (less dispersed) than the X's. One way to obtain the Y 's is by
considering mean-preserving spreads that are symmetric around the mean.18 This corresponds to
18The de¯nition is restricted to cases where X and Y are incomparable in the sense of ¯rst order stochastic
dominance. See Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994). All we need for the result is the log-concavity of the ratio FY =FX.
21the notion that bidders are better informed upon receiving a signal Y rather than X. Note that if





We make use of the following claim from (3). Assume that the support of X and Y is [0;1].
Claim 3 If X ¹lc Y and E[X] = E[Y ], then E[XjX · x] ¸ E[Y jY · x] for all x.
Proof. X ¹lc Y means by de¯nition that
fX












0 FY (s)ds = 1.
Hence, we need to demonstrate that
R x
0 FX(s)ds R x
0 FY (s)ds has a mode at 1 to establish our result. In other
words, we need to show that
R x
0 FX(s)ds R x
0 FY (s)ds · 1 for all x. We will proceed by contradiction. Assume
that x¤ < 1 is the mode of
R x
0 FX(s)ds R x
0 FY (s)ds: Also denote by y¤ < 1; the mode of FX
FY : The existence of y¤
is guaranteed by the de¯nition of the unimodal order. We also know by Whitt (1985) that y¤ · x¤.































in contradiction with the assumption that x¤ is a mode. Finally, note that
R x
0 FX(s)ds R x
0 FY (s)ds is increasing
in x, implying E[XjX · x] ¸ E[Y jY · x] for all x, since






k:n as the expectation of the kth order statistic out of a sample of n independent draws
from a distribution X. Let X and Y have common support given by [0;1] and let E[X] = E[Y ].
Denote by ¯FP;X
n (x) and ¯FP;Y
n (x) : [0;1] ! R the symmetric equilibrium bid functions in ¯rst-price
average value auctions with n bidders who receive private signals drawn from X and Y , respectively.
Proof of Lemma 2. Denote by F and G the cumulative distribution functions of X and
Y , respectively. The log-concave order implies that G
F is unimodal. Let t 2 (0;1) be the mode.
Then t is also the mode for G
n¡1








0 F n¡1(s)ds is increasing on [0;^ t].
This implies that
E[max(Y1;:::;Yn¡1)jmax(Y1;:::;Yn¡1) · x] ¸ E[max(X1;:::;Xm)jmax(X1;:::;Xm) · x]
for all x in [0;^ t], since max(Y1;:::;Yn¡1) » Gn¡1 and max(X1;:::;Xn¡1) » Fn¡1. Claim 3 also
guarantees that E[Y jY · x] ¸ E[XjX · x] for all x. This establishes the existence of tX;Y;n ¸ ^ t
with the desired property.
To demonstrate the existence of t0, we observe that the function max : [0;1]n ! R is convex in
every component and since Yi ¹lc Xi we have that
E[max(Y1;:::;Yn)] < E[max(X1;:::;Xn)]

















establishing the existence of t0
X;Y;n with the desired properties.
Observe that in our case, tX;Y;n = t0
X;Y;n, which is a special case of the theorem above. Further,
in our formulation, as in any other example based on symmetric distributions, one can easily show
that tX;Y;n ¸ E[X]: The lemma states that better informed bidders will increase their bids for low-
values while decreasing their bid for high signals. Mares (2001) demonstrates that this e®ect is even
stronger in second-price auctions since (for equivalent signals and inferences) the bidder does not
have to shade his equilibrium bid. In that case, better information leads to more aggressive bidding
for every signal.
Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 1
A merger or collusive bidding ring involves the e®ects described in both of the above lemmas. A
decrease in the number of bidders is associated with a reduction in the winner's correction. We can
also note that (at least for log-concave signals) the merged groups are better informed in the sense
19See Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994) for details.
23of the previous lemma than individual bidders. As such, this should add to their level of bidding for
low signal values while tempering the bids for high signals. The combination of these e®ects is char-
acterized in the following result. Consider n = km and denote as before by ¯
FP;X
km the equilibrium




and denote by ¯FP;Xk
m the equilibrium bid function of the m bidding rings each receiving k signals.
Note that the theorem below leaves the door open for the possibility of a crossing between the two
bidding functions, at least for low values of m.
Proof of Theorem 1. The ¯rst part of (i) is a direct consequence of the previous two lemmas.


















By de¯nition, E[X] = E[Xk]. Note that for large m we have the following relationships
¯
¯E[max(Xk; 1;:::;Xk; m)] ¡ E[max(X1;:::;Xkm)]
¯
¯ · "
for " arbitrarily small since
lim
m!1
E[max(Xk; 1;:::;Xk; m)] = lim
m!1
E[max(X1;:::;Xkm)] = 1:
This means that we can ¯nd mk such that for m > mk







since as before we have that
E[max(X1;:::;Xkm)] > E[max(Xk; 1;:::;Xk; m)] > E[X]:


























This gives us the second part of the theorem.
Appendix D: Proof of Theorem 2
In the proof of the revenue theorem we make use of the following claim. Let private signals be
distributed according to X, and let F represent the cumulative distribution.
24Claim 4 The revenue from the symmetric equilibrium in an average value auction with n bidders
may be expressed as
RF(n) = ¹F ¡ (¹F
n:n ¡ ¹F
n¡1:n¡1):
Proof. We will present a proof for second-price auctions. Since we are in symmetric environ-
ments with independent signals, revenue equivalence applies, so our results carry over to ¯rst-price





















We will make use of the following recurrence relationship between the expectations for order statistics
n¹F
n¡1:n¡1 = ¹F
n¡1:n + (n ¡ 1)¹F
n:n:21
Also note that the density of the second highest order statistic out of a draw of n i:i:d: variates is
fn¡1:n(x) = n(n ¡ 1)f(x)Fn¡2(x)(1 ¡ F(x)):





























F(x) ¡ (n ¡ 1)Fn¡1 + (n ¡ 2)Fndx
= ¹F
n¡1:n + ¹F ¡ (n ¡ 1)¹F
n¡1:n¡1 + (n ¡ 2)¹F
n:n
= ¹F ¡ (¹F
n:n ¡ ¹F
n¡1:n¡1):
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider for simplicity the case where n = 2m bidders participate in
the auction and merge into m groups, each of size 2. Let G be the distribution of the average of
two private signals. According to the previous claim we have that the revenue following a merger is
given by













(1 ¡ G(s))(1 ¡ Gm¡1(s))ds
20See for example Waehrer, Harstad, and Rothkopf (1998).
21See, for example, Arnold, Balakrishnan, and Nagaraja (1992).





1 ¡ F(s))(1 ¡ F2m¡1(s)
¢
ds:
Note also that by standard stochastic variability order arguments,22 we can establish that
Z x
0
(1 ¡ F(s))ds ¸
Z x
0
(1 ¡ G(s))ds (4)
for every x. Since, by de¯nition, we have that ¹F = ¹G, we can conclude that
RF(2m) ¸ RG(m) ,
Z 1
0




We will establish the latter inequality in two steps
Z 1
0










The last step is apparent once we observe that max(X1;X2) ¸ X1+X2
2 , and since max(X1;X2) » F2
and X1+X2
2 » G we have by stochastic dominance that F2 · G and hence
F2m¡1 · Gm¡1
which gives us the desired second inequality.
For the ¯rst step, we can treat 1 ¡ F and 1 ¡ G (if necessarily normalized by ¹F and ¹G) as
probability densities. The inequality in (4) then establishes the stochastic dominance relationship
between these two densities. Since F2m¡1 is increasing, we obtain the desired inequality in step 1.
Similar arguments establish the result for mergers with group size of k ¸ 2:
22See for example Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994).
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